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SUMMARY
Real options analysis is a promising approach to model investment under uncertainty. We employ this approach to
value stockpiling of antiviral drugs as a precautionary measure against a possible inﬂuenza pandemic.
Modiﬁcations of the real options approach to include risk attitude and deviations from expected utility are
presented. We show that risk aversion counteracts the tendency to delay investment for this case of precautionary
investment, which is in contrast to earlier applications of risk aversion to real options analysis. Moreover, we
provide a numerical example using real world data and discuss the implications of real options analysis for health
policy. Suggestions for further extensions of the model and a comparison with the expected value of information
analysis are put forward. Copyright r 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty plays a crucial role for many investment decisions, and investments in health care are no
exception. The traditional ways to account for uncertainty in health economics are by means of
(probabilistic) sensitivity analyses and conﬁdence intervals, using cost-effectiveness acceptability curves
to present the outcomes (Briggs and Gray, 1999; Fenwick et al., 2006). A problem with this kind of
analyses, however, is that investments are considered as ‘now-or-never’ decisions, whereas in reality
deferral is one of the most frequent decisions taken, to enable the decision maker to assemble more
information (Claxton, 1999). In investment theory at large, real options theory has gained interest as a
tool to analyze investment decisions (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). The real options
approach stems from the ﬁnancial literature and was proposed as a more realistic alternative to
neoclassical investment theory. In essence, the latter states that an investment should be undertaken
when expected discounted beneﬁts exceed a critical value: the expected discounted costs of some project.
Again, decisions are considered as having a ‘now-or-never’ character. In contrast, real options theory
explicitly recognizes the option to postpone an investment. Valuing this option implies including the
*Correspondence to: Center for Prevention and Health Services Research, National Institute for Public Health and the
Environment (RIVM), P.O. Box 1, 3720 BA, Bilthoven, The Netherlands. E-mail: Talitha.Feenstra@rivm.nl
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related opportunity costs of an investment, so that the critical value of expected discounted beneﬁts of a
project is higher using real options analysis than using neoclassical analysis.
A real option framework is most suitable when three key characteristics are present. These are
irreversibility of the investment, uncertainty about the reward and the ability to defer the investment.
Irreversibility means that once an investment has been made, it is not possible to recover the investment
or at least not without large cost. Uncertaintymeans that the net beneﬁts of an investment project follow
a stochastic process (over time). Finally, the investment can be deferred in the sense that the investor
may delay the investment for some time in order to await new information or better values of the
stochastic beneﬁts.
These characteristics are present in many health care decisions, so that it is worthwhile investigating
the role of the real options framework in understanding health care decision making. Still, although
applications of real options theory have been intensively investigated in several economic disciplines,1
examples in the health economics literature are scarce. In fact, we found only three studies applying real
options analysis in a medical context. Palmer and Smith (2000) showed how the adoption of an
unspeciﬁed new health technology may be modeled as an options problem and explored possibly fruitful
areas of application within health economics. Drifﬁeld and Smith (2007) showed by means of a
numerical example how real options analysis can be used to inform decisions about the treatment of
individual patients with abdominal aortic aneurysm. Finally, Eckermann and Willan (2008) extended
the Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI) approach (Claxton, 1999) to the case of partial
irreversibility. That is, the case where reversion is costly but not prohibitively so, creating the option of
trialing the effectiveness of some project even when one has already invested in that project.
The current paper extends this small literature by looking at an important type of decision in public
health: precautionary investment to prevent large public health problems, for instance, an inﬂuenza
pandemic. Speciﬁcally, we consider decisions by a government on stockpiling antiviral drugs to prepare
for an inﬂuenza pandemic. This investment problem is suitable for the real options approach because
the aforementioned three key characteristics are present. Irreversibility is a realistic assumption, since
antiviral drugs cannot easily be resold in the market. Uncertainty is present in many aspects of the
problem, especially the unknown probability of outbreak and the uncertain beneﬁts of the drug after an
outbreak, about which more information becomes available over time. Finally, the investment can be
deferred in the sense that the government may delay the investment for some time in order to await new
information about, for example, the probability of outbreak. Delaying investment, however, of course
bears the risk of an outbreak during the deferral period. Furthermore, we analyze modiﬁcations of the
real options approach, including risk attitude and prospect theory, since risk plays a crucial role for
decision makers facing the threat of a pandemic.
The threat of a new inﬂuenza pandemic has become evident since the World Health Organization
raised the pandemic alert due to the spread of the new inﬂuenza A/H1N1 in April 2009. Moreover, the
worldwide spread of avian inﬂuenza A/H5N1, and the occasional, often fatal, cross-species transmission
to humans are serious candidates for another human inﬂuenza pandemic. During the last century there
have been three pandemics, of which the 1918–1919 ‘Spanish ﬂu’ (A/H1N1) was the most severe causing
at least 40–50 million deaths worldwide (Johnson and Mueller, 2002; Nguyen-Van-Tam and Hampson,
2003). The 1957–1958 ‘Asian ﬂu’ (A/H2N2) and the 1968–1969 ‘Hong Kong ﬂu’ (A/H3N2) were
relatively mild with probably less than 1 million deaths (Dunn, 1958; Nguyen-Van-Tam and Hampson,
2003). Pandemic contingency planning is key to mounting an adequate response to the morbidity,
mortality and the corresponding demand on health care, if a new pandemic would occur (Webby and
Webster, 2003; WHO, 2005). Lacking an effective vaccine, therapeutic treatment with antiviral drugs is
1For example, Ekern (1988) for petroleum projects, Pennings and Lint (1997) for research and development, Kelly (1998) for a
mine property, Bollen (1999) for the dependence of capacity changes on product life cycles, and Fenichel et al. (2008) for
precautionary ﬁsheries management.
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a realistic alternative (Health Council of the Netherlands, 2005). To be able to provide the population
with these drugs on time, stockpiling is necessary, and currently there is much attention on investment
decisions in stockpiling antiviral drugs (Balicer et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2006; Siddiqui and Edmunds,
2008).
To sum up, the present paper is the ﬁrst to apply real options theory in a public health perspective, by
investigating the decision of a country to invest in antiviral drugs for emergency treatment in case of an
inﬂuenza pandemic. We derive the theoretical solution to this problem in Section 2 and subsequently
present the application to antiviral drugs in Section 3, comparing our solution to the solution under
neoclassical investment theory. In Section 4 we extend the example to include risk aversion and show
that risk aversion and the option to defer investment have opposing effects on the optimal timing of
investment. Section 5 analyzes the incorporation of prospect theory. Finally, Section 6 provides a
discussion and Section 7 concludes.
2. MODEL
Suppose a country is contemplating whether to invest in antiviral drugs. We assume, in accordance with
most applications of real options analysis, that the decision maker (i.e. the government) has the
objective to maximize the expected net present value of beneﬁts. This is equivalent to risk neutrality with
respect to monetary outcomes, meaning that an individual is indifferent between choosing a gamble and
a certain outcome with the same expected payoff.
The beneﬁts of having sufﬁcient antiviral drugs are taken to be the reduced losses in health and
productivity when a pandemic occurs: H. We express these in monetary terms. We assume a pandemic
can occur in each quarter of a year. In addition, the decision maker uses an evaluation period,
depending on the shelf life of the antiviral drugs, as is explained further in Section 3. Since we
do not know beforehand in which quarter, if ever, a pandemic outbreak will take place, we multiply
H by the discount factor (D) corresponding to half the evaluation period. Such a discount
factor corresponds to our assumption of a uniform distribution with regard to the probability of
when an outbreak would occur. As a result, we obtain the discounted beneﬁts in case of out-
break, R(O)5DH. In case of no outbreak (N), no beneﬁts are obtained, so R(N)5 0. It is uncertain
whether a pandemic will occur, and we have to model this uncertainty. The occurrence of a pandemic
outbreak in a particular evaluation period (consisting of a predetermined number of quarters) is
assumed to be binomially distributed, with hazard rate p (which depends on the quarterly probability (q)
of outbreak). Hence:
 No Outbreak ðNÞ with hazard rate l p in any evaluation period
 Outbreak ðOÞ with hazard rate p in any evaluation period
ð1Þ
The discounted expected beneﬁts (i.e. the avoided health costs) over the considered time horizon are
given by j5E(R)5 pDH. Furthermore, uncertainty exists about the hazard rate and the beneﬁts in
case of outbreak. These sources of uncertainty cause the option to delay to be valuable, which will be
shown below. In the remainder, we focus on uncertainty concerning the hazard rate, because adding
uncertainty around the beneﬁts will not change the qualitative nature of the results. The value of the
hazard rate is described by a stochastic variable that is assumed to follow a Brownian motion:
dp5 spdz, with s the standard deviation and dz a Wiener process, that is, a continuous-time stochastic
process, related to the random walk process. It depends on scientiﬁc progress concerning the elicitation
of the true value of the hazard rate (Gollier and Treich, 2003). The expected beneﬁts therefore also
follow a Brownian motion: dj5 sjdz.
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The price of the drugs (P) and the quantity of antiviral drugs to be bought (Q), which depends on the
size of the population, are taken as exogenous variables. Therefore, total purchase costs are given by PQ.
Finally, there are stockpiling costs (S(Q) ) of the drugs, so that total costs amount to C5PQ1S(Q).
According to the option value approach, it is optimal for the government to choose the time of
investment so as to maximize the value of the investment opportunity F(j):
FðjÞ ¼ max E½ðjt  CÞe
rt subject to dj ¼ sjdz ð2Þ
where E is the expectation, t is the unknown future time point at which the investment is made, and r is
the risk-free interest rate. For comparison, according to standard cost-beneﬁt analysis, it is optimal for
the government to choose between investment at time t or no investment in order to maximize the
expected net present value: max E[(jtC)e
rt] with jt5 pDH having a ﬁxed rather than a stochastic
value as deﬁned in (2). The critical value of j, j, that is, the expected discounted beneﬁt above which it
is optimal to invest, equals C.
The critical value of j using the option value approach may be determined using Bellman’s principle
of optimality. This principle breaks a multi-period planning problem into simpler steps (subproblems)
at different points in time. In terms of a decision tree model, each node may be considered a
subproblem. The optimality principle then starts from the idea that an optimal solution to the entire
problem cannot contain suboptimal solutions to any of its subproblems. If a suboptimal solution to
some subproblem was included, the solution could be improved by improving the solution to this
subproblem. In other words, an optimal policy has the property that, whatever the initial action, the
remaining actions are optimal with respect to the subproblem starting at the state that result from the
initial action (Bertsekas, 1976). Or again in terms of decision trees: for each node, the strategy from this
node onwards must be optimal. For problems in discrete time, backward reasoning may then be used to
derive an optimal policy. For problems in continuous time, like the one at hand, the principle may be
used to derive the so-called Bellman equation that characterizes an optimal solution, using subproblems
over very small periods of time, dt. The Bellman equation is given by:
rFdt ¼ EðdFÞ ð3Þ



























From these formulas it can be seen that it is optimal to invest only when the costs of investment plus
an additional amount are lower than the expected revenues (i.e. the product of the hazard rate and the
averted costs in case of a pandemic outbreak). Hence, compared to standard cost-beneﬁt analysis, the
critical value is larger. This additional amount reﬂects the option value of delaying the investment in
antiviral drugs and being able to proﬁt from new information about the hazard rate. The higher is the
value of a1, the lower the required wedge between expected beneﬁts and costs (Equation (5)) and the
lower is the option value.
The parameter a1 is decreasing in s indicating that greater outbreak uncertainty leads to a higher
option value, a higher critical value, j, and hence a higher return on investment that is needed to make
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the investment proﬁtable. a1 increases in r, indicating that heavier discounting of future outcomes leads
to a lower return on investment that is needed to make the investment proﬁtable.
The option value of delaying the investment in stockpiling therefore essentially grows with increases
in epidemiological uncertainty and reductions in the interest rate, as we will see more clearly in the next
section.
3. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE/APPLICATION
We illustrate how the model of Section 2 can be applied in a real world context by using available data
for the Netherlands on the potential costs of an inﬂuenza pandemic (Lugne´r et al., 2009). We assume a
conventional annual discount rate r of 4%, or 1.041/4–15 0.0098535 0.9853% per quarter (CvZ, 2006).
3.1. Costs
At present, the most popular medicine for dealing with inﬂuenza is Tamiﬂu. We estimate price per
deﬁned daily dose (DDD) by dividing total costs by quantity used, which is available in the SFK
database (www.SFK.nl). We take the most recently available price per DDD of Tamiﬂu as the current
purchase costs per unit (P). This is the average price of the fourth quarter of 2007, which was P5 4.12
Euros per DDD.
In addition to purchase costs, several other costs are associated with an investment in antiviral drugs.
First, when there is no pandemic outbreak, the drugs have to be stored, causing stockpiling costs.
Second, in case of an outbreak, a patient can only collect a prescription at the pharmacy after a
telephone consultation with the general practitioner, and, hence, prescription costs are generated
(Lugne´r et al., 2009). We treat the latter as negative beneﬁts, however, because they only occur when
there is a pandemic, whereas the purchase and stockpiling costs occur regardless of an outbreak.
Tamiﬂu tablets have a shelf life of approximately ﬁve years. Thereafter, the drug ceases to be effective
and has to be destroyed and the decision maker has to make a new decision (buying a new stock or
waiting). During a ﬁve-year period, we assume that the probability of two or more outbreaks is small
enough to ignore.2 Thus, a single purchase of antiviral drugs will be sufﬁcient for this period. Hence, the
decision maker views a time horizon of at most ﬁve years (i.e. the evaluation period) after the moment of
investment, and shorter in case a pandemic actually occurs.
A deterministic compartmental dynamic model was constructed to evaluate the effect of antiviral
therapy (Lugne´r et al., 2009; Mylius et al., 2008). The whole population was assumed to be susceptible
to a new pandemic virus. Individuals started out being susceptible, and upon infection they progressed
through a succession of stages: being infected but not infectious (latent); being infected and infectious;
recovering; and ﬁnally, immune (removed). The model included key epidemiological parameters such as
contact rates among and within age groups, the length of infectious period, and the probability of
transmission of the virus during a contact. The use of antiviral drugs affects the recovery rate and
infectivity of a person with symptomatic inﬂuenza, if treatment starts within 48 h of onset of symptoms.
In the calculations it was assumed that the pandemic virus behaves as a seasonal inﬂuenza virus in the
sense that risk of symptoms, risk of illness, risk of death upon infection are similar to the risk observed
for seasonal inﬂuenza. The Dutch population consists of approximately 16.4 million people. The
dynamic model predicts that 10.4 million would be infected with the inﬂuenza virus if no intervention
was offered. Treating 80% of the individuals who would have had inﬂuenza-like illness with antiviral
drugs would reduce the transmission among the population, and as a result, 8.6 million people would be
2For a yearly probability of 0.03, changes of no outbreak, one outbreak and more than one outbreak are 0.86, 0.13 and 0.01,
respectively.
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infected. Of these, 60% would have had inﬂuenza-like illness (5.2 million) and 4.1 million would use
antiviral drugs.
We assume further that each patient needs 10 DDD’s of Tamiﬂu, so that Q5 41 million doses of
Tamiﬂu have to be bought, costing in total about h169 million. Stockpiling costs for this amount are
h50 thousand per year (Lugne´r and Postma, 2009), resulting in a present value of h220 thousand for an
annual discount rate of 4% and a ﬁve year horizon. Total costs (C) then amount to almost h170 million.
3.2. Beneﬁts
We use the estimates of the beneﬁts of Lugne´r et al. (2009), which we convert from 2005 prices to 2007
prices using harmonized consumer price indices (CBS, 2008). Three different effects are distinguished.
One is discounted life years saved due to the use of antiviral drugs. These are estimated to be around
38 900 (Lugne´r et al., 2009). Taking a conservative estimate of the willingness to pay per life year saved
of h20 000 (Casparie et al., 1998), this translates into savings in life years in case of a pandemic with a
value of about h778 million.
In addition, considerable savings in production losses due to fewer illnesses and fewer deaths are
expected. These savings are estimated by means of the friction cost method (Koopmanschap et al., 1995)
and the assumptions of Oostenbrink et al. (2004) and Postma et al. (2005), at about h1.8 billion.
The third kind of effects is costs saved with antiviral drugs, because of lower health care consumption
caused by inﬂuenza complications. Reductions in health care consumption are obtained in several areas:
fewer general practitioner (GP) visits due to fewer complications, fewer antibiotics, less consumption of
over-the-counter drugs, and less hospitalization (Lugne´r et al., 2009). As mentioned before, negative
beneﬁts also exist: the GP consultation and prescription costs for antiviral drugs.
Total net savings in case of a pandemic and presence of antiviral drugs are then obtained by
subtracting the costs from gross savings, yielding an amount of h2.638 billion. Using a 4% yearly
discount rate, and taking the discount factor corresponding to the midpoint of the ﬁve year period, that
is, 10 quarters, we obtain an estimate of D of 0.907, and, hence, the present value of net savings is equal
to DH5 h2.392 billion. Table I lists the details for these estimates.
3.3. Hazard rate
There is no clear consensus in the literature concerning the probability of outbreak. Therefore, like Balicer
et al. (2005), we consider the number of pandemic outbreaks with a high impact during the last century.3
In this period, three of such outbreaks have taken place, resulting in a probability of 0.75% (q5 0.0075)
per quarter. The probability of at least one outbreak within 5 years is then equal to 14%, which we treat as
the probability of one outbreak for convenience (i.e. the hazard rate p5 0.14). In this case, the expected
discounted net savings are j5 pDH5 0.14h2.392 billion5 h335 million. Further, we assume this hazard
rate to evolve according to a Brownian motion without drift (i.e. a Brownian motion process without an
upward or downward trend), and a volatility of 0.05 per 5-year period: dp5 0.05pdz.
3.4. Optimal timing of investment
The estimate of the variance and the assumed value of the discount rate allow us to estimate Equation (7),
giving a value for a1 of 3.35. Applying Equation (5) then results in a wedge between beneﬁts and costs of
about 42.5%, indicating a sizeable inﬂuence of the inclusion of the option value of waiting. The critical
value j (see Equation (5)) is equal to h243 million, again indicating that the option value of deferral
implies a considerable wedge between expected costs (C5h170 million) and the required value of
expected beneﬁts. The expected beneﬁts (j5 h335 million) are above the critical value in this example;
3That is, excluding the recent outbreak of the new inﬂuenza A/H1N1.
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however, so it is still optimal to invest immediately. An overview of the parameter estimates is given in
Table II.
Using the estimated beneﬁts of h335 million, and the parameter estimates above, we can also
calculate at what value for p a value for the critical value j of h335 million or over will be reached. The
critical hazard rate equals 10.1% per 5-year period, that is, 0.533% per quarter. Waiting is
recommended when the hazard rate is lower than this critical value.
In comparison, the critical hazard rate under net present value analysis is only 7.1% per 5-year
period (0.368% per quarter). Hence, only for very low probabilities of an outbreak the investment will
be cancelled. Real options analysis prescribes a more precautionary investment strategy in order to
proﬁt from the potentially valuable option of waiting for more information.
4. ANALYSIS UNDER RISK AVERSION
Empirical evidence suggests that many individuals are not risk neutral but instead risk averse
(Abdellaoui, 2000; Holt and Laury, 2002), which means that individuals are reluctant to choose a
gamble rather than a certain outcome with the same, but possibly lower, expected payoff. Van den
Goorbergh et al. (2003) and Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) have therefore extended real options theory
to take account of risk aversion. They found that risk aversion reinforced the tendency to postpone the
decision implied by valuing the option of deferral. Because investment in antiviral drugs concerns
precluding losses instead of seeking gains, however, this ﬁnding does not hold in our situation.
Suppose that instead of maximizing net present beneﬁts, the decision maker is risk averse and
maximizes expected utility. Expected utility theory considers utility over wealth levels (U5U(W)). The
Table I. Estimated savings of antiviral drugs in case of an inﬂuenza
pandemic (Lugne´r et al. 2009)
Area Savings in millions of Euros
Value of life years saved 778
GP-consultations for inﬂuenza 16.8





GP consultations for antiviral drugs 44.3 /
Pharmacy costs for antiviral drugs 26.0 /
Net savings (H) 2638
Price level 2007.
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decision maker will invest whenever the expected utility of wealth after investing is higher than the
expected utility of wealth when not investing. Let R(O)5 Z5DH, and let C and p be as deﬁned above.
In addition, let Z be the loss caused by a pandemic and X the present wealth level. The expected utility
from investing will then be given by pU(XZ1ZtC)1(1p)U(XC). The expected utility from not
investing is pU(XZ)1(1p)U(X). According to traditional cost-utility analysis, it is therefore optimal
to invest whenever:
pUðX Zþ Zt  CÞ þ ð1 pÞUðX CÞ4pUðX ZÞ þ ð1 pÞUðXÞ ð8Þ
Because we can set U(0)5 0 and normalize X so that X5Z, (8) simpliﬁes to:
pUðZt  CÞ þ ð1 pÞUðZ CÞ4ð1 pÞUðZÞ ð9Þ
Rearranging gives:
p½UðZt  CÞ þUðZÞ UðZ CÞ4UðZÞ UðZ CÞ ð10Þ
Then we deﬁne wt ¼ pðUðZt  CÞ þUðZÞ UðZ CÞÞ and d ¼ UðZÞ UðZ CÞ, so that the similarity
with the risk neutral case becomes clear. Accounting for the option value of delay now implies an
optimization problem given by:
FðwÞ ¼ max E½ðwt  dÞe
rt subject to dw ¼ swdz ð11Þ
The remainder of the analysis can then be ﬁnished by replacing j and C in the Appendix by w and d,





After replacing w and d by their full expressions, this becomes:
pðUðZ CÞ þUðZÞ UðZ CÞÞ ¼
a1
ða1  1Þ
ðUðZÞ UðZ CÞÞ ð13Þ


















aa11 ðUðZÞ UðZ CÞÞ
a11
ð15Þ
We now have Z and B1 expressed in terms of a1, the parameters p, C, and Z, given some utility
function U(W).
Investigating the consequences of this extension is interesting. In particular, it is of interest how
the optimal decision rule changes when we assume a concave instead of a linear utility function (i.e. a
utility function corresponding to risk aversion over wealth instead of one corresponding to
risk neutrality). The power utility function U5Wg is often used in economic applications (Wakker,
2008). The case of go1 corresponds to risk aversion, whereas g41 implies risk proneness and




















ðZg  ðZ CÞgÞ
 
þ
ðZg lnZ ðZ CÞg lnðZ CÞÞ
gðZg  ðZ CÞgÞ
 
ð16Þ
INVESTMENT IN ANTIVIRAL DRUGS 1247
Copyright r 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 19: 1240–1254 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
Since a1=pða1  1Þ41 and Z4C in virtually all real-world examples, this derivative is positive
whenever:





ðZg  ðZ CÞgÞ
 
ogðZg lnZ ðZ CÞg lnðZ CÞÞ ð17Þ
This holds true for g40 for reasonable values of Z. A higher degree of risk aversion, therefore,
lowers the critical value of Z and leads a decision maker to invest sooner than if he would be risk
neutral. A similar reasoning holds for risk proneness and results in an incentive to wait longer before
investing.
If we repeat our numerical example with risk neutrality replaced by risk aversion, where risk aversion
is captured by the power utility function U5W0.9, we ﬁnd that Z is lowered substantially (from about
h1.7 billion to about h1.5 billion for a value of Z of h3 billion). In our example, while the critical value
changes considerably, this does not matter much, since the optimal decision to invest immediately is not
altered.
5. EXTENSION TO PROSPECT THEORY
The above analysis used an expected utility framework. Although this framework can be very useful for
prescriptive purposes, there is evidence that expected utility lacks descriptive validity (Starmer, 2000).
Therefore, we extend our analysis to investigate how conclusions change when we incorporate prospect
theory into the analysis. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)
has become the most important alternative to expected utility.
The above model can readily be extended to include behavior according to prospect theory.
Preferences depend on a reference point in prospect theory and outcomes better than the reference point
are considered as gains, whereas worse outcomes are considered as losses. Two major effects are
included in prospect theory. First, decision makers are loss averse, meaning that losses loom larger than
gains. This is modeled by including a loss aversion parameter with a value higher than 1, which is
multiplied by the value of the loss. Second, decision makers do not evaluate probabilities linearly but
transform probabilities. That is, probabilities are given a decision weight, which is not necessarily equal
to the probability itself. In particular, small probabilities tend to receive more weight and large
probabilities less weight.
A conventional reference point in this example seems to be the case of no pandemic outbreak. The
outbreak of an inﬂuenza pandemic is then considered a loss, and this loss gets additional weight. It turns
out that loss aversion is not relevant in our example, however, since losses occur in any scenario so the
loss aversion parameter drops out of the equation (see the Appendix for a proof). We assume the
following well-known probability weighting function (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992):
wðpÞ ¼
pg
ðpg þ ð1 pÞgÞ1=g
ð18Þ
with w(p) the weight given to the probability of outbreak.4 g is a behavioral parameter describing the
nonlinear transformation of probabilities. It was estimated to be 0.69 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
This corresponds to the usual case where small probabilities are given more weight and large
probabilities are given less weight.
The remainder of the analysis is similar to that of Section 2, with the only modiﬁcation that the
hazard rate p should be replaced by the decision weight w(p) given to that probability. In our example,
the probability is quite small so we obtain a decision weight that is higher than the probability itself
4We only need the probability weighting function for losses here because there are no gains present in this example.
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(w(0.14)5 0.2080). That is, the government is pessimistic in this case, overestimating the probability of
a pandemic outbreak. The subjective expected beneﬁts now are h514 million, considerably higher than
the objective expected beneﬁts of h335 million. Probability weighting therefore induces the policy maker
to invest in antiviral drugs sooner in our numerical example.
6. DISCUSSION
Most of the literature on option values in health care is purely theoretical (Eckermann and Willan, 2008;
Palmer and Smith, 2000). The only application considered in the literature (Drifﬁeld and Smith, 2007)
concerned decisions for individuals. We have now shown an application of the theory in public health.
In agreement with the standard real options problem, the option value causes the critical value of
beneﬁts to increase in our example, making waiting more attractive. On the other hand, the introduction
of risk aversion diminishes this critical value in our problem. This is in contrast with the ﬁndings of van
den Goorbergh et al. (2003) and Hugonnier and Morellec (2007), who show that, in the common real
option investment problem, risk aversion will reinforce the option effect and increase the critical value
of beneﬁts further, since the variability in the expected beneﬁts can cause more harm under concave
utility functions. The ﬁnding of risk aversion causing a countervailing force against the incentive to wait
due to the option value may be important in other cases.
An explanation for our opposite ﬁndings is that we investigated the opposite of standard investment
problems. In studying the preparation for a possible inﬂuenza pandemic, there is no beneﬁt (in
monetary terms) to be gained for the decision maker. The purpose of the decision maker is to somehow
manage the losses. Under expected utility and risk neutrality, this does not matter since the optimal
decision is not changed. When risk aversion is taken into account, the optimization problem does
change though. All possible outcomes in our example are losses. The decision maker wants to minimize
the utility lost by these outcomes. The government faces a lottery, with a probability p of a large loss (in
case of an outbreak) and a probability 1p of no loss (i.e. no outbreak and a preservation of the status
quo). By investing, the government can reduce the loss during the outbreak, although the amount of
loss reduction is uncertain. The uncertainty causes the option of delaying the investment to be valuable.
Investigating the impact of using the framework of prospect theory shows that the expected beneﬁts
will be considerably higher than in an expected utility framework. In other words, we ﬁnd that under
prospect theory, investment in antiviral drugs to reduce the losses of a pandemic is considered beneﬁcial
at lower critical values of the beneﬁts than under expected utility. Prospect theory seems to be a more
realistic framework, since governments frequently do not behave according to expected utility, by giving
too much weight to rare events, due to, for instance, pressure by interest groups. It should be kept in
mind, however, that this is only a descriptive analysis and we do not attempt to suggest the use of
prospect theory for prescriptive purposes.
The above analysis can also be conducted when both beneﬁts and costs are stochastic. The only thing
we need is an estimate of the variance of the costs. Modeling both stochastic costs and beneﬁts will be
more complex, though, as pointed out by Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Section 6.5).
It is important to notice the large percentage of beneﬁts that is generated by productivity gains. These
gains cover more than half of total beneﬁts, and make the difference between investing immediately and
postponing the investment. That is, taking a more narrow health care perspective in which productivity
gains are neglected changes the conclusion in our example. On the other hand, we have, by using the
friction cost method, provided a rather cautious estimate of production gains. One could also take a
broader perspective than we did, by for example using the human capital method. In that case
production gains would be even higher than estimated in this study. Indeed, infectious disease
emergencies may violate the assumptions of partial equilibrium, and the presence of a health threat can
have an impact far beyond the direct resolution in productivity from sick patients (Beutels et al., 2008).
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Results may also differ depending on the population considered, for example, if only key workers are
included in the target population for receiving antiviral drugs.
The standard problems where the real options approach is being used consider beneﬁts and costs measured
in monetary terms. An important difference with the health domain is that health beneﬁts are usually not
directly measured in terms of money. An interesting extension of this theory would therefore be to investigate
how things change when effects are measured in other terms. In the health economics area, in particular,
effects are usually valued in quality adjusted life years without explicitly converting these to monetary values.
The analogy of real options analysis with EVPI analysis is also worth mentioning. EVPI analysis was
discussed by Claxton (1999) as an alternative to the usual approach to model uncertainty in health
economic evaluations. Both types of analyses share the premise that there is an extra option in addition
to investing and not investing. Although the option of waiting has a value in real options analysis, the
option of assembling additional information has a value in EVPI analysis. In EVPI analysis, net beneﬁts
are stochastic and the expected costs of uncertainty consist of the probability that a decision based on
mean net beneﬁt is wrong multiplied by the size of the opportunity loss if the wrong decision is made. By
waiting, however, we can lower this probability, in the same way as acquiring more information does in
EVPI. The option value is the maximum value that can be placed on additional waiting for new
information and the costs are the opportunity costs of foregone beneﬁts, whereas in EVPI analysis,
these are the costs of additional sampling. Hence, the two approaches are complementary and do not
replace each other. The one considers the value of waiting for more information, while the other
considers the value of explicitly investing in more knowledge.
We have assumed that the price and quantity of the antiviral drugs are exogenous. The price of the
drugs may depend on the quantity purchased, for example, if a quantum discount can be arranged. This
does not however change the qualitative nature of the problem, in which the emphasis lies on the
beneﬁts. The quantity needed seems to depend to a great extent on epidemiological and demographic
characteristics, so the assumption of exogenous quantity seems to be appropriate.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the real options literature by providing an example in the public health
domain where real options analysis seems to be a useful new tool. We showed how the problem of
investment in the case of antiviral drugs can be modeled in a real options setting, and we applied
this model using real cost data and estimates of beneﬁts. We have conﬁrmed the ﬁndings of Drifﬁeld
and Smith (2007) that the option value can be large and lead to important policy changes in health
care.
Moreover, we have extended the analysis to take into account risk aversion and probability
weighting. Both are relevant issues in the case of decision making on catastrophic occurrences with a
small probability, like an inﬂuenza pandemic. It was shown that risk aversion and overweighting of
small probabilities have a tendency to neutralize the delaying effect of the possession of the option on
investment. The reason that these effects are of opposing signs was that the main purpose of the decision
problem was control of losses, rather than maximization of gains. We recommend a more thorough
development of option pricing techniques in health economics and the investigation into more reﬁned
parameter estimates.
The empirical results in this paper indicate strong evidence favoring investment in antiviral drugs in
the Netherlands. The inclusion of the option value of waiting does not change this conclusion.
Therefore, our analysis supports the decision by the Dutch government in the past to invest in a large
stock of Tamiﬂu, part of which is being used at the moment to treat patients infected by the new
inﬂuenza A/H1N1. When this stock has been run down or destroyed, a new investment decision has to
be made. This decision should take into account the option value of waiting for more information,
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because the present study indicates that this option can be of high value. In our example the investment
is so beneﬁcial that even taking loss of option value into account, it would be optimal to invest in
antiviral drugs. However, taking a narrower health care perspective and excluding production losses,
the option value makes the difference between investing immediately and waiting.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
A.1. Derivation of the results of Section 2
We expand dF using Ito’s lemma:
dF ¼ F0ðjÞdjþ 12F
00ðjÞðdjÞ2 ðA1Þ
Substitute dj5 sjdz into (A1) and noting that E(dz)5 0, we obtain:
E½dF ¼ 12F
00ðjÞs2j2dt ðA2Þ
The Bellman equation then becomes:
1
2F
00ðjÞs2j2  rF ¼ 0 ðA3Þ
Equation (A3) is linear in F and its derivatives, so that its general solution can be expressed as a linear
combination of any two independent solutions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The general solution can
therefore be written as FðjÞ ¼ B1ja1 þ B2ja2 , with B1 and B2 constants to be determined.
In addition, the underneath boundary conditions must be satisﬁed by F(j) in the optimum.
Fð0Þ ¼ 0 ðA4Þ
FðjÞ ¼ j  C ðA5Þ
F0ðjÞ ¼ 1 ðA6Þ
Hence, we have to solve for (A3) subject to (A4), (A5), and (A6).
Trying the function FðjÞ ¼ B1ðjÞ
a1 þ B2ðjÞ
a2 we see by substitution that it satisﬁes (A3) as long as a
is a root of the quadratic equation:
1
2 s
2aða 1Þ  r ¼ 0 ðA7Þ


























with a141 and a2o0. Since a2o0 and (A4) has to hold, B25 0. Hence, we are only interested in a1,
which is a known constant whose value depends on the parameters s and r (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
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To solve for the remaining unknowns B1 and j
, the critical value of the expected beneﬁts at which it
is optimal to invest, we use the other boundary conditions (A5) and (A6). Substituting the general form
into Equation (A5) yields:
j  ð1 B1ðjÞ
ða11ÞÞ ¼ C ðA10Þ








































We now have B1 and j
 expressed in terms of a1 and the given parameter C.
A.2. Proof that loss aversion is not relevant in our example
Prospect theory considers preferences that depend on some reference point r. Outcomes better than
the reference point are gains and outcomes worse than this point are losses. In addition, decision makers
are loss averse, that is, losses loom larger than gains. This loss aversion is captured by a loss aversion
parameter l (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Finally, prospect theory assumes that probabilities are
not evaluated linearly but are transformed instead, as explained in the main text. Our example
includes no gains and can therefore be considered a loss prospect (p:g; h), with a probability p of
the outcome g and probability (1p) of the outcome h. This is evaluated as follows (e.g. Bleichrodt
et al., 2001):
UðrÞ  lð1 wðpÞÞðUðrÞ UðhÞÞ  lwðpÞðUðrÞ UðgÞÞ ðA17Þ
For rZhZg. The reference point is given by the status quo in most cases, so r5X in our example.
g is the worst outcome, that is, the case of a pandemic outbreak, whereas h is the best outcome, that is,
no outbreak. Therefore, with no investment, g5X–Z and h5X. With investment, we have g5XZ1
ZC and h5XC. For convenience and without loss of generality we can set U(X)5 0, so we are left
with:
lwðpÞðUðXÞ UðX ZÞÞ ðA18Þ
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for not investing, which becomes 0 for X5Z. Hence, the only relevant expression is the one for
investing, which is given by:
lð1 wðpÞÞðUðX CÞÞ  lwðpÞðUðZ CÞÞ ðA19Þ
Investment is optimal under standard cost beneﬁt analysis when (A19) is positive, that is:
ð1 wðpÞÞUðX CÞ4 wðpÞUðZ CÞ ðA20Þ
After rearranging, this expression gives:
wðpÞðUðZ CÞ UðX CÞÞ4UðX CÞ ðA21Þ
which is similar to (10), so the real options analysis becomes similar to the real options analysis under
expected utility, except for the replacement of p with w(p), and the value of l does not matter.
REFERENCES
Abdellaoui M. 2000. Parameter-free elicitation of utility and probability weighting functions. Management Science
46: 1497–1512.
Balicer RD, Huerta M, Davidovitch N, Grotto I. 2005. Cost-beneﬁt of stockpiling drugs for inﬂuenza pandemic.
Emerging Infectious Diseases 11(8): 1280–1282.
Bertsekas DP. 1976. Dynamic Programming and Stochastic Control. Academic Press: New York.
Beutels P, Edmunds WJ, Smith RD. 2008. Partially wrong? Partial equilibrium and the economic analysis of public
health emergencies of international concern. Health Economics 17(11): 1317–1322.
Bleichrodt H, Pinto JL, Wakker PP. 2001. Making descriptive use of prospect theory to improve the prescriptive use
of expected utility. Management Science 47: 1498–1514.
Bollen NPB. 1999. Real options and product life cycles. Management Science 45: 670–684.
Briggs AH, Gray AM. 1999. Handling uncertainty when performing economic evaluation of healthcare
interventions. Health Technology Assessment 3(2): 1–134.
Casparie AF, van Hout BA, Simoons ML. 1998. Richtlijnen en kosten. Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde
142: 2075–2077 (in Dutch).
CBS. Harmonized Consumer Price Index. Available at: http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/ [15 September 2008].
Claxton K. 1999. The irrelevance of inference: a decision making approach to the stochastic evaluation of health
care technologies. Journal of Health Economics 18: 341–364.
CvZ. 2006. Guidelines for Pharmacoeconomic Research. College voor Zorgverzekeringen: Diemen.
Dixit AK, Pindyck RS. 1994. Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press: Princeton.
Drifﬁeld T, Smith PC. 2007. A real options approach to watchful waiting: theory and an illustration. Medical
Decision Making 27: 178–188.
Dunn FL. 1958. Pandemic inﬂuenza in 1957. Journal of American Medical Association 166(10): 1140–1148.
Eckermann S, Willan AR. 2008. The option value of delay in health technology assessment. Medical Decision
Making 28(3): 300–305.
Ekern S. 1988. An option pricing approach to evaluating petroleum projects. Energy Economics 10: 91–99.
Fenichel EP, Tsao JI, Jones ML, Hickling GJ. 2008. Real options for precautionary ﬁsheries management. Fish and
Fisheries 9(2): 121–137.
Fenwick E, Palmer S, Claxton K, Sculpher M, Abrams K, Sutton A. 2006. An iterative Bayesian approach to health
technology assessment: application to a policy of pre-operative optimisation for patients undergoing major
elective surgery. Medical Decision Making 26(5): 480–496.
Gollier C, Treich N. 2003. Decision-making under scientiﬁc uncertainty: the economics of the precautionary
principle. The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27(1): 77–103.
Health Council of the Netherlands. 2005. Use of Antiviral Agents and Other Measures in an Inﬂuenza Pandemic.
Health Council of the Netherlands, publication no. 2005/05: The Hague (in Dutch).
Holt CA, Laury SK. 2002. Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic Review 92(5): 1644–1655.
Hugonnier J, Morellec E. 2007. Real options and risk aversion. Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper. Available
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=422600, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.422600.
Johnson NP, Mueller J. 2002. Updating the accounts: global mortality of the 1918–1920 ‘Spanish’ inﬂuenza
pandemic. Bulletin of the History of Medicine 76(1): 105–120.
Kahneman D, Tversky T. 1979. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2): 263–291.
INVESTMENT IN ANTIVIRAL DRUGS 1253
Copyright r 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 19: 1240–1254 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
Kelly S. 1998. A binomial lattice approach for valuing a mining property IPO. Quarterly Review of Economic
Finance 38: 693–709.
Koopmanschap MA, Rutten FFH, van Ineveld BM, van Roijen L. 1995. The friction cost method for measuring
indirect cost of disease. Journal of Health Economics 14(2): 171–189.
Lee VJ, Hong Phua K, Chen MI, Chow A, Ma S, Tai Goh K, Sin Leo Y. 2006. Economics of neuroaminidase
inhibitor stockpiling for pandemic inﬂuenza, Singapore. Emerging Infectious Diseases 12(1): 95–102.
Lugne´r AK, Postma MJ. 2009. Investment decisions in inﬂuenza pandemic contingency planning: cost-effectiveness
of stockpiling antiviral drugs. European Journal of Public Health, DOI: 10.1093/eurpub/ckp119.
Lugne´r AK, Mylius SD, Wallinga J. 2009. Dynamic versus static models in cost-effectiveness analyses of anti-viral
drug therapy to mitigate an inﬂuenza pandemic. Health Economics, DOI: 10.1002/hec.1485.
Mylius SD, Hagenaars TJ, Lugne´r AK, Wallinga J. 2008. Optimal allocation of pandemic vaccine depends on age,
risk and timing. Vaccine 26: 3742–3749.
Nguyen-Van-Tam JS, Hampson AW. 2003. The epidemiology and clinical impact of pandemic inﬂuenza. Vaccine
21(16): 1762–1768.
Oostenbrink J, Bouwmans CAM, Koopmanschap MA, Rutten FFH. 2004. Handleiding voor kostenonderzoek,
methoden en standaard kostprijzen voor economische evaluaties in de gezondheidszorg. College voor
Zorgverzekeringen: Amstelveen (in Dutch).
Palmer S, Smith PC. 2000. Incorporating option values into the economic evaluation of health care technologies.
Journal of Health Economics 19: 755–766.
Pennings E, Lint O. 1997. The option value of advanced R&D. European Journal of Operational Research 103(1):
83–94.
Postma MJ, Jansema P, Scheijbeler HWKFH, van Genugten MLL. 2005. Scenarios on costs and savings of
inﬂuenza treatment and prevention for Dutch healthy working adults. Vaccine 23: 5365–5371.
Siddiqui MR, Edmunds WJ. 2008. Cost-effectiveness of antiviral stockpiling and near-patient testing for potential
inﬂuenza pandemic. Emerging Infectious Diseases 4(2): 267–274.
Starmer C. 2000. Developments in non-expected utility theory: the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under
risk. Journal of Economic Literature 38(2): 332–382.
Trigeorgis L. 1996. Real Options: Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource Allocation. MIT Press:
Cambridge.
Tversky A, Kahneman D. 1992. Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty 5: 297–323.
van den Goorbergh RWJ, Huisman KJM, Kort PM. 2003. Risk aversion, price uncertainty and irreversible
investments. University of Tilburg Discussion paper 2003-119.
Wakker PP. 2008. Explaining the characteristics of the power (CRRA) utility family. Health Economics 17(12):
1329–1344.
Webby RJ, Webster RG. 2003. Are we ready for pandemic inﬂuenza? Science 302(5650): 1519–1522.
WHO. 2005. Department of Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response. WHO global inﬂuenza
preparedness plan: the role of WHO and recommendations for national measures before and during pandemics.
Report WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5. World Health Organization: Geneva.
A. E. ATTEMA ET AL.1254
Copyright r 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 19: 1240–1254 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
